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11. INTRODUCTION
Empirical and theoretical studies show that the local provision of public educa-
tion a⁄ects the households in two ways: it increases the human capital of school-age
children, and it increases the value of their housing. The second e⁄ect leans on the
capitalization of the public education into the value of the housing, that is, the
higher the expenditure in local public education the higher the value of the hous-
ings.
In this paper we show that, when the local provision of public education is
￿nanced by a tax on residents, house price capitalization is a su¢ cient condition
for childless households to support local taxation.
Over the next few decades, the share of childless households (mainly elderly)
is rising. As a direct consequence, it is less and less likely that the pivotal voter
at the local level has children at school age. To the extent that funding of local
public education is determined by local voters (as in many US states), the question
then becomes whether house price capitalization may provide a su¢ cient alterna-
tive mechanism to encourage childless households to support local public education.
The answer we provide is: "yes, but only if the expected duration of childless house-
holds in the property is short". This is an important issue because it determines
whether local public education is possibly under-provided from a welfare point of
view. We show that, when households are likely not to sell the house, they are
unwilling to vote in favor of funding for local public education. If the likelihood
of relocation/house sale on the other hand is high, then house price capitalization
provides a su¢ cient incentive to vote for public spending on education.
This result is in line with empirical evidence. The pioneer in capitalization
study is Oates (1969). He analyzes a 1960 sample of northern New Jersey com-
munities and ￿nds that the value of housing increases in the public expenditure in
the school system. Sonstelie and Portney (1980), Heinberg and Oates (1970), Orr
(1968) and Hamilton (1979) con￿rm Oates￿ s results of the capitalization in terms
of school quality and per pupil expenditure. Benson and O￿ Halloran (1987) ￿nd
that childless voters in California support school spending because of its positive
e⁄ect on their property￿ s value. Brunner and Baldosn (2004) ￿nd that in California
elderly generally vote to decreases the state spending but are much more willing to
support local spending. Hilber and Mayer (2006) show that the older the elderly
are, the stronger is the positive link between the share elderly and local public
spending on schools, that is, the more likely they vote in favor of funding for local
public education. More recently, empirical evidence in Fletcher and Kenny (2008)
con￿rms that an increasing share of elderly results in a very small drop in school
spending.
As in Brueckner and Joo (1991) we allow the capitalization e⁄ect to run through
the sale of the housing, within a context in which public school is locally provided
(at community level). We consider a two period model analyzing a metropolitan
area composed of two communities whose boundaries are exogenously ￿xed. The
area is inhabited by a continuum of households both with and without a child. The
public education is provided by the local government through a head tax set by
a majority voting. In the ￿rst period households vote on the tax and send their
child only to the school belonging to community where they live. Since we assume
that voting takes place only once, the tax remains ￿xed over the two periods.
In the second period with a certain probability households must leave and resell
their housing. New households come into the area, buy housing from the leaving
2households and sort into the communities. In this model the capitalization e⁄ect
means that the reselling price is higher the higher is the tax decided in the ￿rst
period. Our analysis of the voting equilibrium shows that, when capitalization is
strong, low income childless voters are more willing to bear a tax rise, whereas high
income childless voters support a higher tax only if they can vote on a range of
taxes su¢ ciently high. When capitalization is su¢ ciently weak, only high income
childless voters prefer a higher tax.
The probability fo leaving could be considered as a weight given to the capital-
ization e⁄ect. Only when this probability is su¢ ciently high, the marginal bene￿t
from the higher tax, capitalized into the housing price, allows childless households
to vote for a positive tax. In other words, when the expected duration of childless
households in the property is short then they vote for a higher tax to increase the
value of the housing they are going to sell. Furthermore, we show that, when capi-
talization occurs, "ends with the middle" coalitions make the median income voter
never pivotal: high income households (with and without a child) makes coalition
with middle income class with a child, whereas low income households (with and
without a child) make coalition with childless middle income class. We also ￿nd
that, when the median voter is childless, its income is higher than the median one,
whereas when it has a child, its income is lower than the median one. This implies
that the equilibrium tax preferred by the median voter (childless or not), is higher
than the tax preferred by the childless median income voter and lower than the tax
preferred by the median income voter with a child. This result implicitly shows
that it is not possible to exclude voting equilibria in which the tax of the childless
median voter is higher than the tax of the median voter with a child. The di⁄erence
in these taxes depends of income distribution.
When, instead, the capitalization e⁄ect disappears, only households with a child
vote for a positive tax and cross incomes coalitions of voters arise to block public
provision of local education.
A wide literature analyzes the capitalization e⁄ect within a framework where
the level of provision is decided by a voting system. This literature shows that
the capitalization e⁄ect may allow households with a child to support local public
spending in education. Yinger (1981, 1982, 1988) shows that in multi-community
model the capitalization of a local tax into the housing values is a su¢ cient condi-
tion for the median voter with child to support local public spending. When the
government allows the residents to decide the tax by a majority voting, each voter
internalizes the capitalization of public spending into the value of his housing, and
then he votes for a positive tax. Fischel (2001) creates the term "homevoters" and
extends the capitalization e⁄ect to the public provision of local education.
A wide branch of urban economics literature deals with the local provision of
education by a majority voting. Tiebout (1956) is the ￿rst to theoretically model
an economy composed of many independent communities where a generic public
good is provided by the local government by a local tax and households are free to
sort across communities. Many studies attempted to re￿ne Tiebout (1956) by in-
troducing the local provision of public education. Although these attempts strongly
extend this literature, surprisingly the direct introduction of childless households
in a theoretical model is still missing3.
Di⁄erently from Brueckner and Joo (1991), we introduce the analysis of the
3Nevetheless Neychba (2003) stresses the necessity of introducing the childless households in
a multi-community model, he also points out the complications arising from this re￿nement in
terms of voting equilibrium.
3voting equilibrium when a head tax is imposed. The introduction of the voting
behavior of childless households allows this paper to integrate the results in Denzau
and Grier (1984), Fischer (1988) and Epple and Romano (1996) according to which
high income households are more willing to bear a tax rise for increased public
education when the median income voter is not pivotal. The main idea in these
papers is that, when a group of households vote for zero tax, whatever is the
reason, cross incomes coalitions are formed to block the provision of education. In
particular, in Epple and Romano (1996) households vote for zero tax because of
the existence of private school, in our paper, instead, heterogeneity in the presence
of children induces childless households to vote for zero tax when capitalization
is absent. Fletcher and Kenny (2008) and Brunner and Ross (2009) con￿rm our
result by ￿nding that the median voter has income lower than the median one. In
particular, Fletcher and Kenny (2008) ￿nd that a large presence of elderly voters
makes the income of the median voter lower than the community￿ s median income.
Our paper makes capitalization an additional ingredient for these empirical works.
This paper aims at setting up a bridge between the literature on local majority
voting with no capitalization and no childless voters and the literature strictly
related to capitalization. Our work can be thought as a study attempting to stress
the necessity of introducing the voting behavior of childless households in the urban
economics theoretical models in which the local tax is decided by a majority voting.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the model, section 3
and 4 describe respectively the households and the local government, in section 5
we focus on the equilibrium of the model, section 6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a two periods (t = 1;2) model analyzing a metropolitan area divided
into 2 communities (a, b). In the metropolitan area the boundaries and land of
the two communities are exogenously determined. The housing capacity in b is
Hb < 1 while the housing capacity in community a is unconstrained. Houses are
homogenous and each household consumes one unit of housing. We assume that
everybody must own housing to live in a community and that the property of
housing gives access to education. At time 1 the area is inhabited by a mass of
household normalized to 1. This implies that capacity in community a is enough
to allocate more than all households living in the area at time 1. Housing capacity
in community b, instead, is restricted in the sense there is not more space to build
new housings, whereas new housings can be built in community a. For simplicity
we rule out the possibility to rent and assume that once households buy housing
they become residents. We introduce the innocuous assumption that the price for
buying a housing in community a is equal to the cost of building a new one. This
assumption will be used to ease the housing market in community a.
We also assume that there exists another area far away which new households
come from. The characteristics of this area and the migration will be described
below.
In each community the local government imposes a head tax to fund the provi-
sion of education. This tax is decided by the residents in a majority voting. The
sequence of the events is illustrated in ￿gure 1. Households vote on the tax and the
child, if any, goes to school. This is in line with US primary school system where
households can send their children only to the school into the community where
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Fig. 1 The sequence of the events
Joo (1991), tax remains ￿xed over the two periods. In other words, the spending
decision leads to construction of durable investments in a local public school, so
that once investment is chosen, the level is ￿xed.
At time 2, a shock occurs and with probability q households must emigrate.
Households sell their current housing and go to the other area. Once bought housing
in the new area, these households send the child, if any, to school, consume and die
at the end of the period. New households with a child and mass 1 move into the
metropolitan area, buy housing from the leaving households, sort into communities
and send their child to school. With probability (1 ￿ q) households stay put and
send their child to school.
Since the mass of entering households is 1, then housings supplied by leaving
households in community b is not just enough to contain all entering households.
Since at time 2 voting do not take place, the new entrants cannot modify the local
provision of education. In the second period, the housings price in each community
is determined in a competitive market.
3. HOUSEHOLDS
The mass of households living in the area and the mass of coming households are




according to the density f (y). Initial
residents also di⁄er whether or not they have a child. In particular, we denote c
and n respectively household with and without a child. At time 1, nature chooses
the allocation of the households in both communities4. In particular, all childless
household are allocated in community b that is completely allocated. Since the
capacity of community a is enough to allocate all the households in both periods,
then the housing price is normalized to zero. The private good z is considered as
numeraire and its price is normalized to 1:
4We use this assumptions because the main purpose of this paper is studying the existence of
a majority voting equilibrium in which childless voters support a higher investment in local public
education through house price capitalization. Adding the possibility of sorting across communities
at time 1 makes the model more complex and it does not change the quality of our results.
5The inter-temporal utility function for households with a child at time 1 is
de￿ned as follows:
Uc (E;z;q) = v (z1) + E1 + (1 ￿ q)(v (z2) + E2) + qv (z2) (1)
Housing does not appear in the utility function because households consume
just one unit of this and it is homogenous.
The ￿rst and the second term denote the utility at time 1: the household with a
child consumes the numeraire z1 and receives the educational expenditure per stu-
dent E1. The third and fourth term represent the expected utility at time 2. The
discount factor is normalized to 1: In the second period, with probability (1 ￿ q)
households stay put. Since they do not leave the community, their consumption
of numeraire is z2 and the provision of public education per student is E2. With
probability q, households must leave. They sell their housing at price p2 and emi-
grate in the other metropolitan area. Once in the new area, these households buy
housing, pay the tax and send their child to school. Their numerarire is z2.
Utility function for childless households is:
Un (z;q) = v (z1) + (1 ￿ q)v (z2) + qv (z2) (2)
Households without a child do not receive public education; therefore utility
function (2) does not directly depend on E. The budget constraints, at time 1 and
2, write:
z1 = yi ￿ p
j
1 ￿ Tj (3)
z2 = yi ￿ Tj (4)
z2 = yi + p2 (5)
Where j = a;b, denotes the community, the household￿ s income is given by yi,
with i = c;n, and it is assumed to remain the same in both periods. Constraint (3)
gives the consumption of numeraire in the ￿rst periods. At time 1, household living
in community b pays housing price pb
1, whereas we are assuming pa
1 = 05. The local
government imposes a head tax Tj6. In this period, households do not save and
the consumption of numeraire z1 is given by the di⁄erence between income, housing
price and tax. At time 2, the consumption of numeraire for no leaving households
is given by the di⁄erence between income and the tax, as de￿ned in constraint (4).
The numeraire of the emigrating households is z2. They buy housing in the new
area and send their children at school, for simplicity we normalize to zero the level
5Since there is no endogenous sorting at time 1, the assumption of pa
1 = 0 does not a⁄ect our
result. However, we could also normalize pb
1 to zero without a⁄ecting our results.
6The use of a head tax allows to rule out ine¢ ciencies from income taxation. For instance in
Italy there exists a tax on housing (ICI) whose value depends on the size of the housing. In our
simple model of homogeneous housing our head tax could represent the ICI.
6of education and the housing price in the new area. Hence, z2 is simply given by
the sum of the reselling housing price and their income.
The probability q could be a proxy for the expected duration of households in
the property or for the age of residents. The higher q the older are the residents
then the higher is the probability of leaving. In this model we abstract from the role
of inheritage, therefore if households do not sell their housing (leave) before they
die, its value does not enter their utility function. New residents live in community
j only at time 2, their utility writes:
U (E;z) = v (e z2) + E2 (6)
Entering households consider the local tax as a constant because they do not
vote. Each new resident pays Tj to ￿nance the educational expenditure per student,
Ej. Their budget constraint writes:
e z2 = y ￿ Tj ￿ p
j
2 (7)
They do not save, and all income they have left once bought housing and paid
the tax is used to consume e z2.
In the rest of the model we assume v (zi) increasing in all its arguments, twice
continuously di⁄erentiable and strictly concave in zi with i = 1;2, and v000 (zi) > 0:
4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION PRODUCTION
In each community the local government imposes a head tax to collect resources
and provide public education (E). In this model education is considered as a private
good and it is produced from the numeraire according to constant returns to scale
technology with respect to the number of students and the quantity provided. To
make the analysis more tractable we exclude private school. The budget constraints




















Constraint (8) and (9) respectively represent the budget constraint for the local
government at time 1 and at time 2. We assume that the government cannot
transfer resources between periods and that in each community households receive
the same educational expenditure per student.
N
j
1 is the number of households living in each community j at time 1. n
j
1 is the
number of households with a child living in community j at time 17 and E
j
1 is the
educational expenditure per student. At time 1, each household pays Tj, therefore
the tax revenue is TjN
j









i ) is exogenously given.
7At time 2; tax remains ￿xed and the per student education is E
j
2. Tax revenue
in community j is TjN
j











2, where (1 ￿ q)n
j
1 is the number of households
with a child remaining in community j after the shock and n
j
2 is the number of
households with a child entering the community j in the second period.
5. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE MODEL
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the model by solving it by
backward induction. We start by the housing market at time 2 and solve the
maximization problem of the new residents. Then, we proceed by solving the voting
equilibrium of the residents at time 1.
5.1. Housing market and sorting into communities at time 2
At time 2; once the shock has occurred and given the assumption of fully alloca-
tion, the housing supply in community b is vertical at the number of housings sold
by leaving households and it is equal to qHb. In this period, new residents choose
community given Tj. We assume Tb ￿ Ta and the fraction of childless households
at time 1 lower than the housing capacity in community b8. Since in each com-
munity the housings market is competitive, the equilibrium prices are given by the
market clearing condition. However, given the unconstrained capacity, the su¢ -
ciently high housing supply in community a shrinks the housing price to zero. The
housing demand is derived by solving the location problem of the new residents
who take decision according to their indirect utility. The new residents￿indirect

































Entering households choose to live in the community in which their indirect utility
is maximized. The allocation decisions of entrants depend on both housing price
and the educational expenditure per student Ei
j.
Lemma 1 de￿nes the equilibrium in the housings market at time 2.
Lemma 1. Given Tb ￿ Ta, at time 2 there exist two types of housings market
equilibria : i) Ta ￿ pb
2 + Tb with Ea
2 > Eb
2, and ii) Ta = pb
2 + Tb with Ea
2 = Eb
2.
Lemma 1 show that, when Tb ￿ Ta, there could exist two possible equilibria.
We can rule out the equilibria such that pa
2 + Ta = pb
2 + Tb with Ea
2 = Eb
2 because
empirical evidence con￿rms that usually communities di⁄er with respect provision
of education and household￿ s expenditure. Instead, we focus on equilibria in i).
When Ta ￿ Tb, in equilibrium, the education per capita must be lower in commu-
nity b, otherwise all entrant would prefer this community, that given the capacity
constraint is not possible. Given Ta ￿ pb
2 +Tb and Ea
2 > Eb
2, the following Lemma
studies how entrants sort into community according to their income.
8This assumption allows the community with the positive selling housing price (community b)
to be inhabited by households with and without a child.
9Since U (E;z) is assumed to be continuously di⁄erentiable, then V (:) has the same properties.




2+Tj, then a high
income household with a child prefers the community with the highest p
j
2.
Lemma 2 says that high income households with a child prefer community a,
where the tax is higher but the provision of education per capita is also higher.
We can conclude that, at the second period, the housing market equilibrium is
such that community b is inhabited by both childless households (regardless their
income) and low income households with a child. De￿nition 3 allows ￿nding the
housing demand in community b.





such that, at time 2, the















Hence, the sorting equilibrium is such that community b is inhabited by all
childless households and by all households with a child and income at most equal
to e y (:)10. Community b also provides an interesting case of no income segregation.
Low income households with a child prefer to live in the community with a lower
tax even thought the per capita education is lower and the housing price is high11.
Recalling that the housing price in community a is zero, we check whether capital-




dT b > 0. Since the income distribution
of all entrants (with mass 1) is also f (y), then the housing demand of entrants in
community b is F (e y (:)). In words, all entrants with income lower than e y (:) prefer
to allocate into community b together with the remaining residents (childless and
not). The total housing demand in community b is then Db = F (e y (:)) and the
market clearing condition writes:
qHb = F (e y (:)) (12)
The following Lemma solves the housing market equilibrium and it gives the
result in terms of capitalization.






e y ￿ pb
2 ￿ Tb￿
.
Lemma 3 says that the capitalization e⁄ect holds only when the marginal e⁄ect
of a higher education more than compensates the marginal loss from a reduction
in private consumption. When this is the case, an increase in tax increases the
10We remind that by assumption, households sorting into community a are indi⁄erent from
buying a housing from the leaving households and building a new one.
11In this model with do not allow households to change community at time 2. In other words,
we can think a scenario with su¢ ciently high transportation costs. However, allowing households
which were exogenously allocated at time 1 to freely change community at time 2, does not change
the quality of our result. In fact, childless households would choose community b as well since the
expenditure there is lower. High income household with a child, exogenously allocated at time 1
in community b, would go to community a without a⁄ecting the housing market there because the
housing capacity is su¢ ciently high to keep pa
2 = 0. Low income households with a child, instead,
would remain in community b.
9housing demand in community b (the indi⁄erence income goes up). This increase in
housing demand pushes up the housing price. Instead, when the marginal loss from
a reduction in private consumption overcomes the marginal bene￿t from a higher
education, then an increase in tax reduces the housing demand (the indi⁄erence
income decreases) therefore the housing price gets lower. The next Corollary shows
that there always exists a tax such that capitalization exists.
Corollary 1. At time 2, there exists a tax b Tbsuch that the capitalization e⁄ect
exists for all 0 < Tb < b Tb.
Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 introduce the capitalization e⁄ect and show that the
level of tax may be capitalized into the housing prices. In our model there exists
a range of taxes such that the value of the housing, given by its selling price, is
increasing in the tax imposed by the local government to ￿nance public education.
In particular, the higher tax set at time 1 the higher is the selling price at time 2.
For households with a child the marginal bene￿t of a higher tax runs through the
educational expenditure and the reselling price, whereas childless households may
only bene￿t from a higher tax through capitalization.
5.2. Voting at time 1
The aim of this section is studying the majority voting equilibrium. In par-
ticular, in the section 5.2.1 we show that the preferences of households with and
without a child may be single peaked. This implies that the median voter theorem
applies. We still restrict the analysis on the voting problem in the community b
when the capitalization e⁄ect exists, that is 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb:
5.2.1. Single peaked preferences
In this framework, voting takes place once the households are already owners,
then the housing prices at time 1 are given. The voters know the local government￿ s
budget constraints and anticipate the housing market equilibrium at time 2; let us
denote the equilibrium price and education as pb￿
2 and Eb￿






































































































@Tb qv0 (:) = 0 (17)
￿v0 (:) ￿ (1 ￿ q)v0 (:) +
@pb￿
2
@Tb qv0 (:) = 012 (18)
Since the indirect utilities (13) and (14) are strictly concave in the range of taxes
we are interested in ( 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb), then these utilities reach the maximum at a
unique value of the tax. Thus the preferences of both households are single peaked.
Let Tb￿
c and Tb￿
n be the taxes satisfying the ￿rst order conditions (17)-(18). They



















Corollary 2. The optimal taxes are such that Tb￿
n < Tb￿
c for every 0 ￿ Tb <
b Tb.
Corollary 2 says that households with a child prefer a higher tax. This result
is due to the fact that households with a child bene￿t from both the education of
their child and the value of the housing. The next Proposition enables us to show
that the indirect utility of childless households reaches a single peak at a positive
tax.
Proposition 1. When at time 2 the housing price in community b is increasing
in the tax, then there exists a critical value b q such that childless household￿ s most
preferred tax is unique and positive for every q > b q, whereas it is never positive for
q ￿ b q.
12The second order conditions with respect to the tax are:
































is a concave function
of Tb. The intuition is that an excessive increase in tax reduces education because reduces the
number of tax payers in community b.
11q ˆ
q q ˆ >
q q ˆ <










Fig. 2 Indirect utility of childless households




Proposition 1 says that when the probability of leaving community and reselling
housing is su¢ ciently high, then also the childless household￿ s most preferred tax
is positive. The reason is that this probability can be considered as the weight
given to the capitalization e⁄ect. When they do not leave community (q = 0)
the bene￿t from capitalization disappears whereas when households must leave,
then the bene￿t from the capitalization is totally gained. In other words, if the
expected duration of childless households in the property is short, then they vote
for a positive tax. Figure 2 illustrates the indirect utility functions of childless
households13. Considering the probability of leaving community as childless￿age
we can conclude that aging induces childless to support local public expenditure in
education via capitalization. This interpretation has an empirical con￿rmation in
Baldosn and Brunner (2004) and Hilber and Mayer (2006).
The concavity of the indirect utility function of both households with and with-
out a child makes the preferences of all the voters single peaked. This implies that
there exists a majority voting equilibrium by the median voter theorem in which
also childless households support local spending in education because the level of
education is capitalized into the value of their housings.
5.2.2. The Voting Equilibrium
We ￿rstly show that the median income voter may not be pivotal. We follow the
standard literature and study how income drives the voting behavior of households













@y@T b < 0) the utility of higher income households
increases more when the tax is higher (lower), then higher income households prefer
a higher (lower) tax.






is concave even for Tb < 0. Actually, we found concavity only for a positive value of
the tax, nevertheless we remark that we only need that when the probability of leaving community
is su¢ ciently low, then there exists at least one peak at a non positive tax.










@yi@Tb = ￿v00 ￿
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It is possible to see that for households both with and without a child the sign
of (21) is ambiguous and depends on q and Tb.
The following Proposition enables us to study the e⁄ect of household￿ s income
on the voting behavior.
Lemma 4. There exists a strictly increasing function de￿ned over 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb,




, called the indi⁄erence locus, such that high income households,
with and without a child, prefer a higher tax for every pair q;Tb below e q
￿
y;Tb￿




The result in Lemma 4 implies that the indirect utility functions of both house-
holds with and without a child, evaluated at di⁄erent taxes, cross at most once in
the plane (U; y). In particular, for su¢ ciently high probability, the utility with
higher tax cross the other from above, whereas for su¢ ciently low probability the
utility with higher tax cross the other from below.
To complete the analysis we focus only on the probabilities such that all house-
holds prefer a positive tax (that is q > b q). Figure 3 illustrates this scenario according
to the indi⁄erence locus14. In particular, when b q > e q (0), we have two scenarios:
i) all pairs of q and Tb stay above e q
￿
y;Tb￿
(the dotted area), where high income




(the dashed area), where high income households prefer a higher positive
tax. Consider the analysis in terms of childless voters. The presence of a strong
capitalization e⁄ect (high q) makes low income childless household more willing to
bear a tax rise for almost all taxes in the considered range. On the other hand,
high income childless households are willing to bear a rise in tax only when the
tax they vote for is su¢ ciently high. When capitalization almost disappears (q
close to zero), only high income childless household are willing to support a tax for
any level of possible tax lower than b Tb15. The same arguments holds for the case
b q < e q (0) and q > b q16. This result is in line with Denzau and Grier (1984), Fischer
(1988) and Epple and Romano (1996) according to which high income households
are more willing to bear a tax rise for increased public education17.
14In the ￿gure 3 we draw the indi⁄erence locus as convex function in Tb. Actually, we do
not show that the indi⁄erence locus is convex in Tb because it would imply a lot of complex
computations. Moreover, even though the indi⁄erence locus was concave, the qualitative results
providing by the ￿gure would not change.
15The same arguments, of course, apply for households with a child.
16The assumption b q < e q (0) does not necessarily imply that the capitalization e⁄ect is low.
In this case, in fact, we can only infer that the capitalization e⁄ect is lower than in the case of
b q = e q (0). The fact that, in ￿gure 5, the point e q (0) is drawn near to q = 0 is purely a random
graphical representation. Actually it is necessary a very complex computation to show the e⁄ective
location of e q (0) along the vertical axis; therefore we omit that and the comments for the case
b q < e q (0) and b q > e q (0) are equivalent.
17Epple and Romano (1996) explain that the estimation about the e⁄ect of household income
on the willingness to bear such a rise tax is still controversial and, for this reason, they consider
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The behavior of households given in Lemma 4 enables us to characterize the
voting equilibrium and check whether the median income is pivotal.




2 , with Tc and Tn be the preferred tax respectively by the voter with and without
a child and income equal to y.
We remind that Corollary 2 implies Tc > Tn. This inequality mainly drives the
following results. We ￿nd that neither childless voter nor voter with a child can be
pivotal when it has the median income, regardless whether childless are majority
or not in community b.
Proposition 2. A majority voting equilibrium in the community b exists and
the income of median voter is di⁄erent from the median income for every q 2 [b q;1].
Proposition 2 says that, at time 1 in community b, a majority voting equilibrium
exists and the median voter￿ s income is di⁄erent from the media income. The
existence of a "middle class" with or without a child never allows the median
income voter to be pivotal. Consider the case in which high income voters prefer
a higher tax. Since childless voters prefer a lower tax than voters with a child,
then, low income households (with and without a child) make coalition with a
childless middle income class to beat the median income voter, whereas high income
households (with and without a child) make coalition with a middle income class
with a child. In other word, a middle class with a child makes coalition with high
income households whereas middle class without a child makes coalition with low
income households. This Proposition shows that the heterogeneity in the presence
of children induces income classes at the ends of the distribution to get coalition
with the middle income class18.
18In the proof we show that the median income is not pivotal even when high income voters
prefer a lower tax.
14We now separately focus on the extreme case of no capitalization, that is q =
b q. In words, childless household prefer a tax equal to zero, whereas households
with a child prefer a positive tax only via education of their child. The following
Proposition shows that, absent any capitalization e⁄ect, the median income is still
not pivotal.
Corollary 3. When q = b q, median income voter is still not pivotal regardless
whether the majority of voters is childless
Corollary 3 shows that the introduction of heterogeneity like absence of child,
when capitalization does not occur, induces childless voters not to support local
public education and vote for zero tax. In this case, when high income households
prefer a higher tax, the low income households with a child make coalition with
childless voters to block public investment. When, instead, high income households
prefer a lower tax then high income households with a child make coalition with
childless voters. This result is still in line with Epple and Romano (1996) in the
sense that when a group of households is willing to vote for zero tax, whatever the
reason, cross incomes coalitions may arise to block local provision of education. In
Epple and Romano (1996) households vote for zero tax because of the existence
of private school, in our paper, instead, the heterogeneity in the presence of child,
absent capitalization, induces childless households to vote for zero tax.
In conclusion, we analyze where is collocated the income of the median voter.
This is an important issue because we provide a proxy for the level of education in
the community. To do that we check whether the income of median voter is higher
or lower than the median income.
Corollary 4. When the median voter is childless, its income is higher than
the median income, whereas when the median voter has a child its income is lower
than the median one.
The intuition follows the approach in Proposition 2. Consider the case in which
high income voters prefer a higher tax. Since T￿
c > T￿
n, the median voter with a
child and income higher than the median is beaten by a coalition preferring a lower
tax. This coalition is composed of voters with and without a child and income at
most equal to this particular level and childless voters with an income higher than
this level (childless middle class). The childless median voter with income lower
than the median is not pivotal as well. It will be beaten by a coalition preferring
a higher tax. This coalition is composed of voters with and without a child and
income at least equal to this particular level and voters with a child and income
lower than this level (middle class with a child). Corollary 4 is con￿rmed by the
recent empirical work of Baldosn and Brunner (2009). They ￿nd that in California
an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules. This
is exactly what who show when the median voter has a child.
We can conclude that, regardless whether higher income households prefer a
higher or a lower tax, the equilibrium tax preferred by the median voter (childless
or not) is higher than the tax preferred by the childless median income voter and
lower than the tax preferred by the median income voter with a child. The di⁄erence
between the tax of the childless and non childless median voter depends on income
distribution. Di⁄erent income distributions could lead to di⁄erent equilibria in
which the tax preferred by the childless median voter is higher than the tax preferred
by the median voter with a child. This should suggest that when the median
voter is childless, the level of provision of education may be higher than the level
15obtained under a di⁄erent income distribution allowing the median voter to have a
child. Although the rising share of childless households is making more and more
likely that the pivotal voter at the local level is childless, however the presence of
capitalization should not reduce the support for local education.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Empirical evidence and theoretical studies show that when a local government
￿nances the local provision of public education by a tax set by a majority voting,
then households with school aged children support local spending for two main
reasons: children bene￿t from a higher provision of education, and a higher local
public spending is capitalized into the value of the housing.
This model shows that the house price capitalization may provide a su¢ cient
alternative mechanism to encourage childless households to support local public
education. We ￿nd that the median income voter is never pivotal. In particular,
when median voter is childless, his income is higher than the median one whereas
when it has a child, his income is lower than the median one. The di⁄erence
between the tax of the median voter with and without a child depends on the
income distribution. There could exist, in fact, equilibria such that the childless
median voter prefers a higher tax than the median voter with a child.
The presence of the childless households di⁄erentiates our model from the pre-
vious theoretical literature. Although our results predict that capitalization may
induce decisive childless voters to support local education more than decisive voters
with a child; however, a formal welfare analysis could be a good complement for
this work. Further research could also model capitalization by allowing some exter-
nalities, such as rich people with no children preferring to live near rich people who,
if they have children vote for high tax. We are aware that other alternative mecha-
nisms could motivate childless households to vote for local public spending. Cutler
et al. (1993), Hoxby (1998), Goldin and Katz (1997, 1999), Alesina et al. (1999),
Bergstrom et al. (1982), Harris et al. (2001) show that pure altruism, grandparents
who care for their grandchildren and reduced juvenile crime also matter. Neverthe-
less, this paper focuses on the e⁄ect of housing value because housing is an essential
and primary investment. Altruism, care for their children, interest in a lower crime
or environmental quality certainly exist but they do not characterize all households,
like instead housing does; the presence of housing, indeed is a necessary condition
for other interests to exist.
167. APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1
We immediately exclude the case Ta < pb
2 + Tb because Tb ￿ Ta, then we
proceed by contradiction. 1) Consider the scenario Ta ￿ pb
2 + Tb, Ea
2 < Eb
2 and
the housings market is in equilibrium. When Ta ￿ pb
2 + Tb the total expenditure
is weakly lower in community b, since Ea
2 < Eb
2 at least one household with a child
has incentive to go to the community b. Since Hb < 1 and given that at time 1
all childless households are allocated in community b the capacity of community b
is not enough to allocate all households, then this scenario does not characterize a
housing market equilibrium. 2) Consider now Ta > pb
2 +Tb and Ea
2 = Eb
2, and the
housing market is in equilibrium. All residents would prefer community b. However,




2 cannot be an equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2















Proof of Lemma 3
To ￿nd how pb
2 changes according to Tb we apply the total di⁄erential to the
condition (12). Let us to de￿ne a function R(e y;q) = F (e y (:))￿qHb = 0. By totally


















































we apply the total di⁄erential to (11). Let us
de￿ne a function W (e y) as follows:
W (e y) = v (e y ￿ 0 ￿ Ta) + Ea
2 (Ta; e y) ￿ v
￿


















2 = 0 (24)
To obtain
@e y
@T b we put dpb
2 = 0 and we get
de y



















= v0 (e y ￿ Ta) +
@Ea
2 (Ta; e y)
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@e y < 0 (a higher e y means a higher number of
household with a child entering community b, then the education per capita in
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.￿
Proof of Lemma 4











@y@T b is decreasing in q for every 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb: k
Lemma 5 shows that there exists a unique value of q 2 [0;1] which solves the (31)
for any 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb: This called indi⁄erence locus is a function of y and Tb, and
is denoted by e q
￿
y;Tb￿





















By totally di⁄erentiating (32), given a level of income, the slope of the indi⁄erence




















































18That, by result in the proof of Lemma 6 and Lemma 3, is positive. Hence,















Proof of Lemma 5
The cross derivative of the indirect utility function of households both with and





@y@Tb = ￿v00 ￿
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@T b@q = 0, then given









@y@T b is always increasing in Tb, in fact we have:
@3Vi (:)
@y@Tb2 = v000 ￿
yi ￿ pb
1 ￿ Tb￿


























@T b2 < 0, is always positive.￿
Proof of Proposition 1
We only need to show the result for the childless household, and then the result
for households with a child is a direct consequence of Corollary 2. The proof






at a tax Tb su¢ ciently close to b Tb is negative. In the second step we show that






n = 0 is increasing in q, positive for every
probability higher than b q; and negative for every probability lower than b q. Hence,





over 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb gives the following results: i) when the





reaches a unique peak at a positive





reaches its peak at a non positive tax
.











@Tb = ￿v0 ￿
yn ￿ pb
1 ￿ Tb￿














@T b = 0 for Tb = b Tb; therefore there exists an "
su¢ ciently small and a level of tax Tb




@T b ’ 0. Hence, given
19v0 (:) > 0, we have that the slope of the indirect utility function is negative when
Tb = Tb
".






































@T b jT b=0< 0 k





increases in q and it is negative
when the probability of reselling housing is zero. Thus there exists a critical positive
value b q such that the slope of the indirect utility is zero when Tb = 0; we denote

































over 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb, we conclude the proof by showing that: i) the indirect utility of
childless households is maximized at negative tax for every q < b q, ii) it reaches a
peak at zero tax when q = b q , and iii) it presents a unique peak at a positive tax
for every q > b q.￿
Proof of Lemma 6
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@q < 0. The higher the housing supply
the lower is the price equilibrium. Also, given
@e y




@T b, it is










@T b@q > 0.
20Since the slope of the indirect utility function of childless households with respect































￿ v0 (yn) < 0 (44)
￿
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is composed of two steps. Since the indirect utilities of all voters
reach a unique peak over the tax 0 ￿ Tb < b Tb, then the preferences of all voters
are single peaked. Consequently, by the median voter theorem (Black 1958), we
are sure that a unique majority voting equilibrium exists and the median voter is
pivotal19.





shows that both households vote for a positive tax, and a higher income household
prefers a higher tax. We proceed by showing that the median income voter neither
with nor without a child is pivotal. In other words, it is equivalent to say that Tc
and Tn cannot by pivotal because there exists a coalition composed of at least half
the voters preferring a di⁄erent tax. Since Corollary 2 implies Tc > Tn then we
￿rstly have the following results: a) if Tn is the preferred tax of the childless median
income voter, then there exists an income e yc lower than y such that voters with
a child and income e yc also prefer Tn; b) if Tc is the preferred tax of the median
income voter with a child, then there exists an income e yn higher than y such that
also childless voters with income e yn prefer Tc. Given point a) and b) let us now
proceed by contradiction and ￿rstly assume that the pivotal tax is Tc. In this case
voters with a child and income at most equal to y and childless voters and income
at most equal to e yn prefer a tax Tb lower than Tc. Since y is the median-income,
then at least half the voters prefers a tax Tb < Tc. Thus, childless voter with the
median income cannot be pivotal. Assuming now that the pivotal tax is Tn, in this
case childless voters with income at least equal to y and voters with a child with
income at least equal to e yc prefer a tax Tb > Tn. Since y is the median-income,
then at least half the voters prefers a tax Tb > Tn. Thus, neither Tn can be pivotal.
Figure 4 illustrates a speci￿c simple example in which households with a child are
majority.




. In this case
both households vote for a positive tax but higher income households prefer a lower
tax. It is possible to see that the reverse arguments of part i) apply, then even in
this case the median voter￿ s income is di⁄erent from the median one. In particular
now we have e yc > y and e yn < y. Assume that the pivotal tax is Tn. In this case,
childless voters with income at most equal to y and voters with a child and income
at most equal to e yc prefer a tax Tb > Tn. Since y is the median-income, then at
19We remark that by de￿nition the voter with the median income must be one (or childless
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least half the voters prefers a tax Tb > Tn. Thus, childless voter with the median
income cannot be pivotal. Assuming now that the pivotal tax is Tc, in this case
voters with a child and income at least equal to y and childless voters with income
at least equal to e yn prefer a tax Tb < Tc. Since y is the median-income, then at
least half the voters prefers a tax Tb < Tc. Thus, voter with a child and median
income cannot be pivotal.￿
8. APPENDIX B
Proof of Corollary 1
Consider only the case of a positive tax. Concavity of v (:) implies that there
exists a positive level of Tb, denoted by b Tb, such that v0 ￿







v0 (:) is concave and v (:) reaches its highest value at Tb = 0 (where v0 (:) = 0), then
for all taxes higher than zero v0 (:) is increasing in Tb (because v0 (:) decreases in z2,
by concavity assumption, and z2 decreases in Tb). Therefore when tax is to high,








dT b < 0. The










be positive at Tb = 0, then, whatever the shape is, we are sure that there exists at




@T b and v0 ￿
e y ￿ pb
2 ￿ Tb￿
cross.￿
Proof of Corollary 2










@T b > 0 , then
v00 (z) < 0 is a su¢ cient condition for Tb￿
n to be lower than Tb￿
c .￿
Proof of Corollary 3
We still assume that y is the median income and follow the proof of the Propo-





22We ￿rstly analyze the case in which the majority of voters is childless. Assume
that Tc is the pivotal voter. In this case households with a child and income at
most equal to y and all childless households prefer a tax lower than Tc, than this
cannot be pivotal. Since Tn = 0 is the most preferred tax of the majority of voters
no matters their income, then the median income childless voters is not pivotal
either. Consider now that the majority of voters has a child. All households with
a child and income at most equal to y and all childless voters prefer a tax lower
than Tc, since y is the median income and there exist at least a childless voter with
an income higher than y, then Tc cannot be pivotal. The most preferred tax of
childless voters, Tn = 0, can never be pivotal because there exist always a majority
of voters with a child preferring a positive tax. ii) Consider the scenario in which




. When childless voters are the majority, then
Tc > 0 will be beaten by a coalition at least including half voters. However, for
the same reason in i) neither Tn = 0 can be pivotal. When the majority of voters
has a child the reverse arguments of part i) holds and it is possible to show that
median income voter neither childless nor with a child is pivotal.￿
Proof of Corollary 4
Proposition 2 shows that the median voter does not have income equal to the
median income. In this proof we use again the de￿nitions of e yn and e yc given in the
proof of Proposition 2. We separately analyze the case in which a higher income
voter prefer a higher and a lower tax. To show Corollary 4 we show that median
voter has income between e yn and e yc. This implies that the equilibrium tax preferred
by the median voter should be between Tn and Tc.
a) Consider the case in which higher income households prefer a higher tax.
We remind that in this case we have e yn > y and e yc < y. We show that when the
median voter is childless, its income is higher than y but lower than e yn, whereas
when he has a child, its income is lower than y but higher than e yc. We proceed by
contradiction over two steps: 1) we show that when the median voter is childless
its income cannot be lower than the median one; 2) we show that when the median
voter has a child its income cannot be higher than the median one. The proof
simply follows the argument in the proof of Proposition 2. 1) Assume a level of
income yn
" su¢ ciently close to y with y ￿" = yn
" and the associated most preferred
tax given by Tn;". Given e yn and e yc, we know that there exists an income e yc
" < y
such that households with a child and income at least equal to e yc
" and childless
households with an income at least equal to yn
" prefer a tax Tb > Tn;". Since yn
" is
an income slightly lower than the median one, we have that the tax preferred by
all childless voters with incomes lower than the median are beaten by a coalition
of at least half voters. 2) Assume a level of income yc
" su¢ ciently close to y with
y +" = yc
" and the associated most preferred tax given by Tc;". Again, there exists
an income e yn
" > y such that childless households with income at most equal to e yn
"
and households with a child and income at most equal to yc
" prefer a tax Tb < Tc;".
Since yc
" is an income slightly higher than the median income, we have that the tax
preferred by all voters with a child and income higher than the median are beaten
by a coalition of at least half voters.
b) It is ease to show that the same procedure applies when higher income
households prefer a lower tax. In this case we ￿nd the opposite results of point
a). We remind that according to the de￿nitions of e yn and e yc, in this case we have
e yn < y and e yc > y. Hence, we get that the income of the median voter is lower
than y but higher than e yn when he is childless, whereas it is higher than y but
23lower than e yc when he has a child.￿
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